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Challenging the
Policy
Establishment
Alice O’Connor

Among the many challenges community action faces after four decades,
none cuts more deeply into its central mission than the political and
ideological transformation reflected in the rise of the conservative right.
Based on a potent combination of grass roots and institutional organizing,
coalition-building, ideological mobilization, and inter/intra party politics,
the right-wing takeover has empowered a political and policy establishment that is hostile not only to the ideas that animated the War on Poverty
but to the very idea of public action against social and economic inequality. While this transformation has kept community action on the defensive,
confronting the challenge will require reanimating —and realizing — the
vision of community action as a vital force in progressive movement
building and politics.

rom its very beginnings in the 1960s, the federal Community Action
Program was the cause of great fanfare: first as the most exciting and
innovative, soon thereafter as the most controversial of the many programs
launched by the Office of Economic Opportunity as part of the War on Poverty. With federal officials variously keying to its role as a “change agent” in
service delivery, local governance, and — inevitably — political mobilization,
CAP was also beset by competing visions of what the program was, and
should be, all about. Was it to be, as longtime community activists were
insisting, about organizing poor people to change the way political power and
economic opportunities were distributed? Or was it to be about reorganizing
the institutions society had already established for integrating poor people into
the existing opportunity structure?1

F

In practice, to be sure, this was rarely a clear cut, either/or proposition, as
“systems change” advocates encountered fierce political resistance to their
efforts to reform local service bureaucracies, and political organizers built
coalitions around the demand for better and more responsive services in poor
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communities. Nevertheless, the competing visions of community action were
based on very different ideas about the nature of “the poverty problem” and
the role of poor people in solving it. The tensions between them were played
out in deep divisions among poverty warriors in the Johnson administration
and within the OEO. They surfaced, too, in the frequent tug-of-war between
community-based activists and federal administrators over just how much
local autonomy would be entailed in “maximum feasible participation.” And
those tensions are replayed today, in what are often seen as competing demands for scarce funding resources as well as in historical retrospectives that
fault CAP for having been either too radical in its challenge to the status quo,
or not radical enough.2
But from the perspective of our current-day policy and political climate,
what is truly notable about the vision animating the Community Action
Program forty years ago is less its unresolved tensions than something its
advocates shared: the confidence to position CAP as a kind of internal goad to
a policy establishment that was fundamentally liberal in its core commitments,
to civil rights, to expanded opportunities, to ending poverty in their lifetimes,
and especially to using the resources of the federal government to complete, as
Lyndon B. Johnson acknowledged, what remained the “unfinished business”
of New Deal liberalism. Whether by shaking up resistant, often racist, local
administrators or organizing welfare mothers to march on city hall, local
community action agencies — with OEO funding — would push the too-often
politically cautious and tentative liberalism of what then constituted the
mainstream to live up to its own hard-won, yet-to-be-realized commitments.

A Spirit of Confidence
Although clearer in retrospect than at the time, it was this spirit of confidence in and challenge to a more expansive liberalism, far more than any
internal disputes about how to end poverty (such disputes were, after all,
about an extraordinary goal, ending poverty in the U.S.), that captured the
essence of Community Action and that ultimately determined its political fate.
During the early years of the War on Poverty, that fate took the form of
administrative action to rein in the more overtly political, confrontational
activities of local agencies along with various experiments in self-governance
that threatened to upset existing power structures. Soon thereafter, however, it
took a more dramatic turn. For of all the economic and social transformations
that have made the work of community action more of an uphill battle over
the past four decades, none has been more devastating than the demise, if not
outright reversal, of even the War on Poverty’s incomplete embrace of social
and economic justice as the legitimate, achievable goals of collective public
action and public policy.
The reasons for that demise are many; not least among them the failure of
the Johnson administration to devote adequate resources in the first place, or
to anticipate the devastating consequences of its other war, in Vietnam. But
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even more significant over the long term has been the rise to power of a
political and policy establishment that is based on altogether different, ideologically conservative premises, that is openly contemptuous of the very idea
that glaring inequalities can, or should, be redressed through purposeful
economic and social intervention, and that is bent on repealing not only the
expansive liberalism of the Great Society but the entire twentieth century of
progressive and liberal social policy.

The Market as Moral Agent
Having gained considerable political leverage by positioning itself as a counterweight to “big government” liberalism, this right-wing conservative policy
establishment soon revealed itself to be far more than a merely reactive force.
Indeed, as has become breathtakingly evident during the administration of
President George W. Bush, it brings to the table a proactive, not to mention
radical, agenda that aims — with little regard for internal consistency — at
once to reconstruct social policy on an ideological foundation of “free-market” individualism and property rights, and to remoralize social policy through
heavy-handed, government-sanctioned interventions promoting “traditional”
values. Over the past three decades it has built an extensive network of philanthropic, research, and media organizations devoted to a reform program based
on the equally inconsistent combination of privatization, deregulation, and
“devolution” on the one hand, and law and order authoritarianism on the
other. While in power, it has proved quite willing to use the instruments of
“big” government to achieve its economic as well as its moral ends. And
within these venues of government and civil society, the conservative policy
establishment has devoted itself to continuous, and crucial, ideological work.
Thus, beneath the apparent inconsistencies within conservative social policy
lies an overriding idea that links cultural to political economic transformation
by treating “the market” not simply as an unquestionable force of nature but
as itself a moralizing agent. In such a world view, income and wealth disparities are reflections of individual merit, separating the deserving rich from the
undeserving poor. Personal redemption — through enforced work in the lowwage labor market — is the corrective to social disadvantage. And the role of
government is not so much to step aside as it is to attend to the market’s needs
— or, more precisely, to the needs of those who stand to gain most from a
political economy restructured to serve the now-unquestioned “free market”
imperatives of ever-lower wages and ever-higher corporate profits.
Of course, the ascendancy of the conservative policy establishment is by no
means due to ideas and ideology alone. It represents the culmination of a longterm process of right-wing movement- and coalition-building, through which
corporate and social conservatives have made common cause — first in their
common opposition to an overweaning, overtaxing, social engineering “liberal
elite,” but more importantly in their common commitment to the bedrock
principles conservatives have claimed as their own. It rests on the work of
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organizers targeting issues at the local and state as well as national level, and
reframing them as referenda on such presumably conservative values as selfreliance, family responsibility, and Christian morality. It cynically plays on the
bundle of cultural anxieties and, especially, racial animosities that are often
folded within the term “backlash” — even as it exacerbates the economic
insecurities that fuel such anxiety and animosity.3 It relies on a sense of
perpetual embattlement, and a demonology that has crystallized into a tightlywound, historically inaccurate narrative of cultural dissolution that, though
often dated from the 1960s, has in some tellings been pushed back to the
Progressive era and thence to the Enlightenment itself. At the same time, the
conservative policy ascendancy is nowadays stoked by an equally inaccurate
story of budding redemption and free-market triumph.4

A New “Debate”
That the right has made considerable progress in its crusade to reconstruct and
remoralize social policy is nowhere more evident than in the utter transformation of what now passes as the poverty debate, which at this point has not
even the pretense of being about getting people out of poverty — let alone
about social and economic rights, entitlements, or justice — and turns instead
on how to get more poor women off welfare, into the labor market, and
married to the fathers of their children. It is evident in the ongoing transformation of what, after the “end of welfare,” the evisceration of labor rights, the
abandonment of public or affordable housing, and the creeping privatization
of income and health protections for the elderly, remains of the New Deal/
Great Society system of social protections. It is evident in the near-complete
erosion of the progressive income tax — in reality and as an idea — along
with a dramatic upward redistribution of wealth. It is evident in the parallel
derision of public education, available to all on an equal basis, as a democratic
ideal. And it is evident in the effectiveness with which conservatives have been
able to rewrite the War on Poverty as a narrative of abject failure, even as they
misappropriate the language, even the concepts of community action —
“empowerment,” local self-determination — for their own purposes of devolution and faith-based privatization.
But the progress of the conservative social policy agenda is equally evident
in the extraordinary degree to which all of these transformations have been
accommodated by a nominally neutral, or nonpartisan, or centrist political
and policy establishment that now willfully eschews the term “liberal” and all
that is associated with it, and that in the process has capitulated to the ideological premises of the right. Here again the so-called debate over poverty and
welfare is case in point number one. It is a debate in which poverty has ceased
to be the issue altogether and in which the twin evils of “dependency” and
single-parenthood are the targets of attack. It is a debate in which the more
“progressive” position is to resist the imposition of even more stringent work
requirements on already overextended welfare mothers and in which the
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elimination of millions of eligible people from public assistance is celebrated as
a major policy achievement. And it is a debate in which critical voices have
been marginalized if not effectively silenced by self-styled centrists who deem
them unrealistic or irrelevant.
It is thus within a profoundly transformed, basically regressive policy
environment that community action, forty years later, finds itself constantly
having to backtrack and to refight political and ideological battles its original
architects thought (however fleetingly) had been won. And it is thus that
moving ahead with community action’s core anti-poverty agenda will require
first breaking the stranglehold and then, more importantly, constructing an
alternative to what the conservative policy establishment has wrought. That
project of reconstruction is formidable, requiring as it does a broad-based
mobilization of political and ideological resources to reframe and recapture
the poverty debate. But it is also a project to which community action brings
critical attributes and experience.
Among them is a perspective on poverty that, grounded as it need be in
both lived experience and policy analysis, is positioned to frame the issues in a
far more compelling and realistic way, and in particular to shift the focus from
individual failings to the conditions of extreme economic insecurity, political
disfranchisement, and skewed prosperity that poor people, along with increasingly broad segments of the once-stable working- and middle-classes, struggle
against in their everyday lives.5 It is also that perspective from which community action challenges the cultural mythology of free enterprising self-reliance
and moral redemption with which the right has imbued the end of welfare and
the experience of working in the low-wage, low-benefit labor market.

Community Action as Political Agent
Especially important, though, community action is situated to move beyond
the ultimately self-limiting, if necessary, politics of opposition to recapture that
part of its own historical legacy that the shift to the right has effectively
submerged. That legacy is embodied in the vision of community action as a
political agent, acting locally but connected nationally and globally, to forge
the multi-racial and cross-class coalitions that can generate and mobilize
around positive change agendas. It has been reinvigorated in recent years in
community-based campaigns for living wages, affordable housing, environmental justice, adequate health care, and immigrant and labor rights. And
now, more than ever, it continues to insist and act on the reality that fighting
poverty is about the painstaking work of building and sustaining democratic
movements for social and economic justice. This, throughout forty years of
profound transformation, has remained community action’s most important,
enduring challenge to the reigning policy establishment.
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